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The influence of emotion on reactions to a subsequent emotion-inducing event, receiving health 
feedback, was investigated.  208 male and female undergraduate students were given a film 
emotion induction procedure intended to elicit happiness, sadness, or neutral affect. They then 
received false feedback indicating that their risk of getting a fictional type of influenza was high 
or low.  Reactions to the feedback were assessed by measuring affect, risk perceptions, and 
worry. In addition, intentions to engage in health behaviors and actual health information-
seeking behavior were assessed.  Receiving high risk feedback resulted in less positive affect, 
more negative affect and worry, and higher risk perceptions than getting low risk feedback.  Risk 
feedback influenced one measure of behavioral intentions. For low risk participants, 
experiencing an emotion (happy or sad) resulted in taking more pamphlets than those in the 
neutral condition who received the same feedback. High risk participants who experienced an 
emotion took fewer pamphlets than neutral people receiving the same feedback. Increased 
positive affect, worry, and risk perceptions after receiving feedback predicted intentions to 
engage in health behavior, and people who worried more were more likely to take pamphlets 
about the flu.  However, these reactions to feedback did not mediate the relationship between 
feedback and behavior. Behavioral intentions did mediate the relationship between feedback and 
placing contact information in a box to receive more information about the flu.  Overall, the 
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findings have implications for how potentially threatening personal feedback will be interpreted 
and acted upon depending on the receiver’s emotional state at the time of getting feedback.   
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
A woman is on her way to her physician’s office for an appointment during which she 
will get medical test results.  Presumably she will react differently depending on whether the 
results are positive or negative.  What if on the way to the office she is pleasantly surprised by a 
phone call from a close friend?  Or, alternatively, what if she gets a call that leaves her feeling 
down?  Could the emotion caused by the phone call influence the woman’s reaction to her test 
results?  The study reported here investigated the effects of incidental emotion experienced prior 
to receiving health feedback on subsequent affective reactions, judgments, and decisions related 
to the feedback.  
 
1.1 EMOTIONAL REACTIONS TO FEEDBACK 
In general, people experience positive affect in response to positive feedback and 
negative affect in response to negative feedback. This is true in many domains, such as social 
standing (Buckley, Winkel, & Leary, 2004; Leary et al., 2003; Swann, Griffin, Predmore, & 
Gaines, 1987) and task performance (Jussim, Yen, & Aiello, 1995; Woo & Mix, 1997). In some 
studies, investigators provide positive or negative task performance feedback precisely to induce 
positive and negative emotions, respectively (Gerrards-Hesse, Spies, & Hesse, 1994; Spering, 
Wagener, & Funke, 2005; Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996).  People react particularly 
strongly to comparative feedback in which their standing on one dimension is compared to some 
other criterion.  An individual’s standing on a dimension can be compared to some objective 
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standard (e.g., a national guideline), or to another person’s or a group’s standing on the same 
dimension (e.g., the average score on an exam). Studies of the latter type of feedback show that 
people are more pleased and less anxious when they get positive feedback (regardless of whether 
it is absolute or comparative) as compared to negative feedback (Klein, 2003a), even when an 
objective comparison criterion is available (Klein, 1997).   
Similar reactions to feedback occur in the domain of health.  Fries, Bowen, Hopp, and 
White (1997) found that when participants were given false feedback about the amount of fat in 
their diet compared to national intake guidelines, those told their diets were high in fat were less 
calm and content, and more distressed, nervous, sad, and surprised than those told their diets 
were low or moderate in fat.  Similarly, college students told they had borderline high cholesterol 
experienced more distress, sadness, and surprise and less elation, contentedness, and calm than 
did students with normal cholesterol levels (Croyle, Sun, & Louie, 1993).  McBride et al. (2000) 
presented smokers with true information regarding whether they lacked an enzyme whose 
absence has been associated with increased lung cancer risk.  Smokers lacking the enzyme 
reported more fear immediately upon learning of the enzyme absence and at two-month follow-
up as compared to smokers with the enzyme.  Another study showed that women who had an 
abnormal mammogram felt anxiety and worry, even after cancer had been eliminated as a 
possible diagnosis (Lerman et al., 1991). Other research has found that receiving positive health 
feedback in the form of a “normal” test result on an ovarian cancer screening test resulted in 
higher positive affect over the course of a four-month study compared to a matched control 
group that did not undergo screening (Gaugler, Pavlik, Salsman, & Andrykowski, 2006). 
Comparative feedback is also important in the health domain. People pay close attention 
to how their health risk compares to that of others, and being told that one’s percentage of 
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calories from fat is above average results in more worry and increased intentions to reduce risk 
by making dietary changes than being told that one’s intake is below average (Klein, 2003b).  
Similarly, participants told that their risk of causing a car accident was above average were more 
disturbed by this information and expressed greater intentions to take precautions (e.g., wearing a 
seatbelt) when driving than did people told their risk was below average (Klein, 1997).  
 These findings show that any form of positive and negative feedback may result in 
positive and negative affect, and comparative risk feedback is especially likely to influence 
future behavior. The relevant research has been conducted in both laboratory and naturalistic 
settings, and both actual and false feedback have been used in these studies. Although affect has 
been explored as a dependent variable in many feedback studies, the role of affect that is present 
prior to the receipt of feedback has not been systematically explored.   
 
1.2 EFFECTS OF AN INITIAL EMOTIONAL STATE ON REACTIONS TO A NEW 
EMOTION-INVOKING EVENT 
Given that people experience various emotional states throughout the course of a day that 
can each influence feelings, thoughts, and actions, the consequences of one emotion acting in 
concert with another must be explored. Being in an initial emotional state could influence 
people’s affective reactions to a new emotion-invoking incident, such as receiving health 
feedback, in a variety of ways.  For example, one emotion may affect the magnitude of the 
emotional reaction produced in response to the incident. The resulting emotional state could then 
affect subsequent cognitions, including risk perceptions and worry, and behavior, such as health 
protective actions and information-seeking.  
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Effects of an emotional state on a subsequent emotional state. Support for the idea that 
emotions can influence the nature and magnitude of subsequent emotional states comes from 
theory and research on cognitive appraisal patterns and emotions (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 
Antoniou, & Jose, 1996; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  Lerner and Keltner (2000, 2001) proposed 
an appraisal tendency framework showing that experiencing an emotion can cause a person to 
appraise subsequent situations in line with the cognitive appraisals typical of the original 
emotional state.  Recently, researchers have speculated and found some support for the notion 
that experiencing one emotion followed by another emotion with conflicting appraisal patterns 
can result in the minimization of affect (Winterich, Han, & Lerner, 2008). For example, it has 
been found that anger is associated with appraisals of personal control, and sadness with 
appraisals of situational control (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  In preliminary work by Winterich 
and colleagues (2008), inducing anger followed by sadness “blunted” self-reported experience of 
sadness, meaning that the difference between reported sadness post-anger induction and post-
sadness induction was smaller than when sadness was preceded by neutral affect.  The 
researchers also reported that in a subsequent study, experiencing sadness followed by anger 
resulted in blunted reported anger when compared to people experiencing neutral mood before 
anger. Following the logic that conflicting appraisal patterns may lead to minimizing reported 
affect, the converse outcome is plausible. More specifically, experiencing one emotion followed 
by another with a similar appraisal pattern may enhance the affective experience. 
Additional research addresses the question of how one emotional state can affect 
emotional reactions to a new event. Zillmann (1971; 1978; 1996) proposed and has found some 
support for his theory of excitation transfer.  He postulates that sympathetic activation or 
“excitation” from one situation takes time to dissipate, and as long as residual excitation is still 
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present, it can “transfer” to another situation after the initial event triggering the excitation has 
subsided.  Zillmann specifically predicts that the persisting excitation can enhance subsequent 
affective experiences, strengthening the intensity of the experience.  Classic experiments have 
created excitation through physical exercise or sexual arousal, assessing the effect of the 
excitation on subsequent emotion and behavior, such as aggression (e.g., Zillman, Katcher, & 
Milavsky, 1972; Zillmann & Sapolsky, 1977).  
Positive and negative emotional experiences have both been associated with varying 
levels of sympathetic activation (see Cacioppo, Berntson, Larsen, Poehlmann, & Ito, 2000 for 
review), and thus emotion is a candidate for creating excitation that may carry over to enhance 
subsequent emotions. Some research has already investigated this possibility.  Zillmann, Mody, 
and Cantor (1974) found that viewing an arousing emotional film clip (either a hedonic clip of a 
sexual encounter or a clip of a brutal physical assault) influenced participants’ perceptions of a 
character’s feelings in a subsequent negative film featuring an arguing couple. Sadness ratings 
were higher when the initial film clip was arousing compared to when it was non-arousing.  
Other research shows that excitation associated with a negative emotion, anxiety, enhanced 
sexual arousal compared to people who were neutral prior to viewing the sexually arousing 
stimulus (Hoon, Wincze, & Hoon, 1977).  Zillmann’s findings lead to the somewhat 
counterintuitive prediction that an initial emotional event of any valence can increase the 
intensity of the emotion experienced after a subsequent emotion-provoking event, although in 
some cases, “hedonic compatibility” effects have been found such that experiencing an emotion 
followed by another of similar valence results in maximizing the emotional experience (e.g., 
Zillmann, Bryant, Comisky, Medoff, 1981; Zillmann, Mody, & Cantor, 1974). Zillmann (1996) 
admits that such hedonic compatibility needs to be further explored.  The research in which 
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hedonic compatibility effects are found aligns with the previously discussed findings of 
Winterich et al. (2008) that emotions with differing appraisals can result in the blunting of affect 
and with the prediction that matching appraisals can result in increased affect. Excitation transfer 
has been demonstrated in the enhancement of aggression and other affective variables, but no 
research has investigated how the excitation associated with emotional states can influence 
reactions to subsequent feedback. 
Effect of an emotional state on subsequent cognition. Research and theory support the 
notion that an emotional state can also affect cognition. Johnson and Tversky (1983) found that 
negative mood resulted in increased risk perceptions for a variety of negative events, and 
positive mood diminished perceived risk for the same events. Similarly, Salovey and Birnbaum 
(1989) found that sad participants who considered negative future events judged the probabilities 
of the events as being more likely than did happy participants. 
In his Affect Infusion Model (AIM), Forgas (1995) proposed that when making 
judgments, people can use one of four processing methods – direct access of previous judgments, 
motivated processing when pressured to render a particular judgment, heuristic processing when 
trying to exert minimum effort, and substantive processing when interpreting new and often 
complex information to make a judgment.  Using either heuristic or substantive processing 
methods can result in the infusion of affect into judgments.  When processing heuristically, affect 
can become a source of information factored into a judgment.  The use of a systematic 
processing strategy can result in affect-priming such that one’s affective state influences the 
types of items retrieved from memory that are then used for making judgments. Systematic 
processing is predicted to occur when judging a new, complex, or personally relevant target and 
when no specific motivation (other than accuracy) is present.  It is notable that these factors 
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(with the exception of accuracy motivation, as people may want to defend against threatening 
information) are likely to be present when receiving feedback about oneself.  Additional research 
shows that sadness is often associated with systematic (or substantive) processing, and happiness 
and anger are associated with heuristic processing strategies (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz & Strack, 
1990; Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Susser, 1994; Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994). 
As was discussed previously, Lerner and Keltner’s (2000, 2001) work on an appraisal 
tendency framework shows that the cognitive appraisals associated with one emotional 
experience may carry over to influence the appraisal of new situations. For example, anger, with 
its accompanying appraisals of certainty and control (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), results in lower, 
more optimistic risk estimates for a variety of negative events. Similarly, fear, an emotion 
associated with appraisals of uncertainty and lack of control (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), results 
in higher, more pessimistic estimates (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003; Lerner & 
Keltner, 2001).   According to Smith and Ellsworth (1985), sadness, like fear, is associated with 
uncertainty and lack of control, and happiness, like anger, is associated with certainty and 
control, so similar risk estimate patterns are expected.   
Further supporting the influence of affect on risk judgments is research on the notion of 
“risk as feelings” (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001) and the affect heuristic (Slovic & 
Peters, 2006; Slovic, Peters, Finucane, & MacGregor, 2005).  Loewenstein and colleagues 
propose a dual process model of deliberative and experiential thinking (similar to that proposed 
by Epstein, Lipson, Holstein, & Huh, 1992) when making judgments (including risk 
perceptions), and experiential thinking is believed to be influenced by affective factors rather 
than probabilistic information.  The affect heuristic refers to the way that people associate affect 
with stimuli to varying degrees, and these affective associations are used to construct judgments 
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(Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Slovic et al., 2005).  Although both approaches 
focus on the affect associated with the target of the risk judgment, it is conceivable that affect 
from a previous situation could alter the emotional experience.  Indeed, the only study looking at 
the influence of two contiguous emotions showed that experiencing sadness followed by anger, 
two emotions with conflicting appraisal patterns, resulted in less optimistic risk perceptions than 
when anger was preceded by neutral affect (Winterich et al., 2008).   
Risk perceptions can clearly be affected by emotional states. Most of this research has 
looked at the role of trait affect or induced affect on risk perceptions but not the occurrence of 
two temporally close emotions.  The proposed study will attempt to replicate the findings of 
earlier research and to show that happy participants perceive their risk as lower than sad 
participants do. The relationship between perceived risk and behavioral intentions will also be 
explored to replicate the finding that risk perception predicts intentions and behavior (e.g., 
Brewer et al., 2007; Weinstein et al., 2007).   
Effects of an emotional state on subsequent worry. Worry has also proven to be an 
important construct involving both affective (e.g., distressed feelings) and cognitive components 
(e.g., ruminating thoughts), predicting intentions to engage in self-protective behavior such as 
cancer screening, flu vaccination, and seatbelt use (Chapman & Coups, 2006; McCaul & 
Mullens, 2003; Zajac, 2007).  For example, Zajac (2007) found that participants who were 
induced to worry about the flu expressed greater intentions to get a flu shot relative to a control 
group. Receiving positive feedback is expected to result in less worry, whereas receiving 
negative feedback will result in increased worry and intentions.  Prior affect will indirectly affect 
intentions to the degree that it enhances emotional responses to feedback.   
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Behavioral intentions and behavior. In addition to the reactions described above, 
intentions to engage in health behavior and actual information-seeking behavior have real-world 
consequences for health. Health messages that result in more fear cause more behavior change 
than do low fear appeals (Witte & Allen, 2000), and so both intentions and behavior are 
predicted to be affected by feedback such that high risk feedback will result in greater intentions 
and behavior than low risk feedback. Prior affect may indirectly affect behavior by influencing 
reactions to the feedback, so reactions to feedback may mediate the relationship between 
feedback and behavior. Because intentions predict behavior (Ajzen, 1985; Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 1975; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), they will also be tested as mediators.  
 
1.3 THE CURRENT STUDY AND HYPOTHESES 
Although some research already explores the relationships among an emotional state and 
subsequent affect, cognition, and behavior, these relationships clearly need to be more fully 
explored.   Research showing that feedback (in health or other domains) can result in strong 
emotional responses has often been conducted in a relatively isolated manner.  Prior affect may 
be statistically controlled in these studies, but only two studies (Winterich et al., 2008) have 
systematically manipulated prior affect to explore changes in emotional responses.  The work of 
Zillman and colleagues and preliminary studies by Winterich and others supports the idea that 
contiguous emotional experiences act in concert with each other such that later emotional 
experiences are influenced by earlier ones.  Zillman’s work has often had the goal of 
investigating aggression and other states of arousal without focusing on the influence of specific 
emotions.  No research has investigated the role of prior emotion in how people respond to 
feedback about themselves.  The current experiment fills these gaps by creating one emotion and 
10 
 
investigating its effect on a subsequent emotional experience, namely receiving feedback about 
one’s own health; this allows the richness of a real world feedback experience to be better 
captured in the context of the controlled laboratory environment. The study also attempts to 
replicate previous findings linking emotions, risk perceptions, worry, and behavior.   
In this initial investigation, a 3 x 2 between-groups experiment was conducted to explore 
the role of prior affect and reactions to feedback. Happiness and sadness, two basic emotions that 
are often used to represent more general positive and negative affect and that have different 
cognitive appraisal patterns, or neutral affect were first induced.  Participants were subsequently 
given false positive (low risk) or negative (high risk) feedback about the likelihood of their 
experiencing a fictitious health problem.  Affective reactions, worry, perceived risk, behavioral 
intentions, and information-seeking behavior were assessed after the receipt of feedback. The 
following hypotheses were tested: 
Hypothesis 1: Receiving high risk health feedback will result in more negative affect, less 
positive affect, more worry, and increased risk perceptions when compared to receiving low risk 
feedback.  
Hypothesis 2: Experiencing an emotion and feedback of similar valence and appraisal 
patterns will result in stronger reactions compared to people initially experiencing neutral affect. 
More specifically, experiencing happiness followed by low risk feedback will result in less 
negative affect and worry, more positive affect, and lower risk perceptions than people 
experiencing neutral affect before receiving low risk feedback. Similarly, experiencing sadness 
followed by high risk feedback will result in more negative affect and worry, less positive affect, 
and higher risk perceptions compared to people initially experiencing neutral affect before the 
high risk feedback. 
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Experiencing an emotion followed by feedback of the opposite valence and appraisal 
patterns will result in weaker reactions than when the feedback is preceded by neutral affect.  
More specifically, experiencing happiness followed by high risk feedback will result in less 
negative affect and worry, more positive affect, and lower risk perceptions than people initially 
experiencing neutral affect before the same feedback.  Similarly, experiencing sadness followed 
by low risk feedback will result in more negative affect and worry, less positive affect, and 
higher risk perceptions than people who are neutral before getting the same feedback.  
Hypothesis 3:  High risk feedback will cause greater intentions to engage in health 
behavior compared to low risk feedback. People receiving high risk feedback will be more likely 
to engage in information-seeking behavior than those receiving low risk feedback. Also, 
reactions to feedback (in the form of positive and negative affect, risk perceptions, and worry) 
will predict behavioral intentions and behavior. 
Hypothesis 4: The relationship between risk feedback and behavior will be mediated by 
behavioral intentions and reactions to feedback, including affect, risk perceptions, and worry. 
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2.0 METHOD 
 
2.1 MANIPULATION PILOT TESTING 
In order to explore the effects of emotion on risk feedback, both emotion induction and 
risk feedback materials were designed and pilot-tested.  To establish clips that result in a neutral 
affective state, participants (Ps) rated several videos; happiness and sadness videos were not 
piloted as several reliable clips already exist in the literature (Gross & Levenson, 1995; 
Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007).  Also, risk percentages of varying magnitude and relative 
distance from each other were tested to determine which numbers would constitute low and high 
risk feedback. 
Neutral Affect Video Induction Pilot Test 
Procedure. Fifteen Ps viewed four documentary video clips on a computer.  The videos 
included a 70s clip about what visitors can expect when visiting an Alaskan national park, a 90s 
clip about the history of the ruins in Luxor, Egypt, an 88s clip about the founders of the 
transcontinental railroad, and a 92s clip about how refracting telescopes work.  A 20s delay was 
included between the end of each clip and the instructions for viewing the next clip.  After 
viewing each clip, Ps rated how amused, embarrassed, loving, angry, fearful, prideful, anxious, 
guilty, sad, confused, happy, shameful, contemptuous, interested, surprised, disgusted, joyful, 
and unhappy they felt on a scale from 0 (not at all/none) to 8 (extremely/a great deal) with 4 
indicating somewhat/some. 
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Results.  Descriptive statistics were viewed to determine which clips were most neutral. 
Following Gross and Levenson’s (1995) convention, clips with mean ratings less than 2 for all 
emotion words were sought. Means ranged from 2.60 to 4.20 for the “interest” item for all clips, 
but this was not viewed as problematic in that higher interest ratings could illustrate engagement 
in the video viewing task. Three of the four clips met the qualifications set forth, and the railroad 
and telescope clips were chosen for use in the study.  
Risk Feedback Manipulation Pilot Test 
Procedure.  Forty-five male and female Ps read six scenarios giving a fabricated average 
risk and a personal risk percentage that was either higher or lower than average.  Both absolute 
and comparative risk information were given because previous research indicates that 
comparative risk information can influence judgments and behavior in addition to absolute risk 
(Klein, 1997), and it was believed that providing both types of risk information would lead to the 
most impactful risk feedback. Scenarios stated that the average risk was 12% with personal risk 
percentages of either 1% or 23%, 34% with personal risk estimates of 14% or 54%, and 57% 
with personal risk of 27% or 87%.  Ps rated perceived absolute risk magnitude on a scale from 1 
(very low) to 7 (very high) with 4 indicating neither low nor high. Ps also rated how their risk 
compared to “the average person” on a scale from 1 (much lower) to 7 (much higher) with 4 
indicating about the same. 
Results. A two-way within-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) with average risk 
(12%, 34%, or 54%) and comparative risk (low or high, specific numbers given in previous 
paragraph) serving as independent variables was conducted. The main effect of average risk 
number on perceived risk magnitude was significant, F(1, 88) = 210.32, p < .001, as was the 
main effect of comparative risk, F(1, 44) = 702.63, p < .001.  The pattern of means for absolute 
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risk perceptions in Table 1 shows that the higher the average risk, the higher the Ps perceived 
their own risk in an absolute sense.  Being told that comparative risk was low resulted in lower 
perceptions of risk magnitude than when comparative risk was high.  The interaction between 
average and comparative risk numbers was also significant, F(1, 88) = 12.89, p < .001, but this 
interaction was not probed further.  A two-way ANOVA was conducted using comparative risk 
perceptions as the dependent variable.  The main effect of average risk number on perceived risk 
compared to others was significant, F(1, 88) = 48.93, p < .001, as was the main effect of 
comparative risk, F(1, 44) = 1020.57, p < .001.  The pattern of comparative risk perception 
means in Table 1 is similar to the pattern found for the absolute risk magnitude variable. Again, 
the interaction was significant, F(1, 88) = 18.87, p < .001, but the interaction was not further 
explored.   
Based on these results, an average risk percentage of 34% with a low risk of 14% and a 
high risk of 54% was selected for use.  The figure of 14% was low in both an absolute and 
comparative sense, and 54% was considered high. When the average was 12%, both the high and 
low risk percentages (1% and 23%, respectively) were perceived as low. When the average was 
54%, it was thought that the high risk percentage, 87%, might be so high as to be unbelievable. 
 
2.2 MAIN EXPERIMENT 
Participants 
Ps were 208 male and female introductory psychology students at the University of 
Pittsburgh (67.4% female).  All Ps were run individually in one of two quiet rooms containing 
only two desks, two chairs, and one computer, and they received one credit towards completion 
of a research participation requirement. 
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Design 
 The study was a 3 x 2 between-groups factorial experiment with initial emotional state 
(happy/sad/neutral) and risk feedback (low/high) serving as independent variables.  Dependent 
variables are detailed below and include affective reactions to feedback, perceived risk, worry, 
behavioral intentions, and behavior. 
Procedure 
Overview and cover story.  Because labeling emotions can inhibit emotions from carrying 
over to another situation (Keltner, Locke, & Audrain, 1993; Schwarz & Clore, 1983), Ps were 
told that they were completing two unrelated studies to make use of the one hour appointment.  
One study, described to Ps as a study of information processing, served as the emotion induction.  
The other was a two-part study presented as a study of health risks among college students that 
was actually intended to allow the presentation of false feedback. The first part of this health 
risk/false feedback study occurred before the information processing/emotion induction study in 
order to collect health information that was the basis of the feedback provided later.  After the 
information processing/emotion induction study, the second part of the health risk/false feedback 
study occurred, and Ps were presented with false feedback that was ostensibly based on the 
information provided earlier.  To make this cover story more convincing, Ps completed separate 
informed consent forms for each study at the beginning of the session, and materials for each 
study were formatted slightly differently (e.g., typeset in different fonts).  The health risk/false 
feedback study was administered on paper at one desk, and the information processing/emotion 
induction study was conducted on a computer at a different desk in the same room. 
Health risk/false feedback study – Part 1.  Ps read an article containing false information 
about college students’ risk factors for a fictitious influenza virus A(H17N8), a subtype of 
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influenza (flu) that supposedly results in normal flu symptoms such as fever, extreme tiredness, 
nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, muscle aches, and sore throat (CDC, 2006), as well as chronic fatigue 
that persists for two years.  This health problem was chosen so experimenters could provide 
believable feedback, and the consequences of getting this type of flu (i.e., experiencing normal 
flu symptoms and long-term chronic fatigue) resonated with college students.  
Ps completed a risk factor questionnaire that they were told could be used to predict their 
likelihood of getting the specific flu described to them.  Some of the questions exhibited high 
face validity (e.g., “Have you recently been around somebody exhibiting flu-like symptoms such 
as fever, tiredness, and sore throat?”) to enhance Ps’ perception that their responses could 
logically be used to determine their personal flu risk. Because a battery of completely face valid 
questions might have caused Ps to form expectations of their risk and not believe experimenter 
feedback if it violated their expectations, several other questions (e.g., “How many siblings do 
you have?”) were not face valid. The risk factor questions varied in controllability so that Ps 
believed that getting the flu was neither wholly controllable nor uncontrollable.  At the end of the 
questionnaire, Ps rated their absolute risk of getting influenza A(H17N8) on a 7-point scale 
ranging from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 7 (extremely) and a percentage scale ranging from 
0% to 100%. They also rated their risk compared to other Pitt students of their age and sex on a 
scale from 1 (much lower) to 7 (much higher) with 4 indicating the same.  Ps gave their 
questionnaires to the experimenter and then moved on to the information processing/emotion 
induction study.  To minimize the possibility of experiencing anxiety or focusing on risk 
perceptions in anticipation of feedback (Shepperd, Ouellette, & Fernandez, 1996; Taylor & 
Shepperd, 1998), Ps were not told that they would receive health risk feedback. 
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Information processing/emotion induction study.  Ps were randomly assigned to an 
emotion (happy/sad) or control (neutral) condition that determined the emotion that was induced 
through the viewing of film clips, a highly effective method of emotion elicitation (Gerrards-
Hesse et al., 1994; Rottenberg et al., 2007; Westermann et al., 1996).  Ps were informed that they 
would watch two contiguous film clips and that they should “please watch [each] film carefully.”  
Using this instruction ensures that Ps focus on the task but minimizes the likelihood of demand 
(Rottenberg et al., 2007).  As recommended by Rottenberg et al. (2007) and to assure that all Ps 
began viewing the induction clip in similar affective states, all Ps watched a neutral 92s clip 
about how telescopes work (Discovery Education, 2004). 
Ps then watched another video clip designed to induce the emotion to which they were 
randomly assigned.   The happiness video was a 155s clip from When Harry Met Sally (Reiner, 
1989) featuring two characters in a diner discussing women faking orgasms.  The sadness 
induction video was a 171s clip from The Champ (Zeffirelli, 1979) that shows a boy watching 
his father die.  For the neutral condition, Ps viewed an 88s documentary clip about the founders 
of the transcontinental railroad (Zwonitzer & Chin, 2003). The happiness and sadness clips have 
been validated in a number of studies (Gross & Levenson, 1995; Rottenberg et al., 2007), and the 
neutral clips were pilot-tested for this experiment (see section 2.1).  
Following each film clip, Ps completed a one-page questionnaire in which they recalled 
the content and settings of the clip to promote the belief that the study was about information 
processing.  Embedded in these questionnaires was a variation of an emotion inventory 
recommended by Rottenberg et al. (2007) in which Ps were given a list of 18 emotions and asked 
to “please indicate the greatest amount of emotion experienced for EACH emotion [they] 
experienced while watching the film” on a scale of 0 (not at all/none) to 8 (extremely/a great 
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deal) with 4 indicating somewhat/some.  Ps indicated if they had seen the video clip before and if 
they looked away from the screen during any portion of the film. The emotion inventory after the 
first neutral clip served as a baseline emotion measure, and the emotion scale after the second 
clip was used as a manipulation check.  After completing the second questionnaire, the 
experimenter told Ps that the information processing/emotion induction study was complete.  
Health risk/false feedback study – Part 2.  Ps were randomly assigned to receive low risk 
or high risk feedback.  They were told that while they were participating in the information 
processing/emotion induction study, the experimenter calculated their personal risk for influenza 
A(H17N8) based on their questionnaire responses.  The experimenter gave Ps a folder containing 
a one-page feedback sheet.  The underlined items in the feedback statement below were 
handwritten to give the illusion that the experimenter calculated each P’s risk and filled it in.  
Ps in the positive feedback condition were informed that “A previous study shows that 
the average Pitt student of your age and sex has a 34% chance of getting influenza A(H17N8) in 
the next year.  Your personal risk of getting influenza A(H17N8) is 14%, which is below 
average.  This means that out of 100 Pitt students with the same risk factors as you, 14 will get 
influenza A(H17N8) in the next year.”  Ps in the negative feedback condition received identical 
information except that the individual risk was 54%.  To more clearly illustrate the risk 
estimates, Ps in both conditions saw an array of 100 circles (Feldman-Stewart, Kocovski, 
McConnell, Brundage, & Mackillop, 2000).  On one array, 34 circles were filled in to indicate 
the average Pitt student’s risk; the other array illustrated the P’s individual risk with 14 or 54 
circles, depending on the condition. The feedback sheet also informed Ps that preventive 
measures like frequent hand-washing, getting an influenza vaccination (flu shot), and taking 
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antiviral drugs can reduce the risk of getting the flu.  When Ps finished reading the feedback, 
they were given the dependent measures. 
Dependent measures.  Ps completed an emotion inventory modeled after the PANAS 
(Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) to assess their emotional state after receiving feedback. On 
this inventory, they rated how interested, distressed, content, excited, upset, happy, strong, 
guilty, scared, sad, hostile, enthusiastic, proud, anxious, irritable, alert, surprised, ashamed, 
inspired, jittery, nervous, determined, attentive, calm, amused, active, afraid, and elated they 
were “at the present moment” on a 5-point scale (1 = very slightly or not at all, 2 = a little, 3 = 
moderately, 4 = quite a bit, 5 = extremely).  Ps rated how low or high they thought their risk of 
getting influenza A(H17N8) was on a 7-point scale with 1 indicating very low and 7 indicating 
very high. Risk perceptions were also assessed by having Ps indicate whether they disagree 
strongly, disagree mildly, agree mildly, or agree strongly with the following statements: “I feel 
that I’m going to get influenza A(H17N8) this year” and “I feel very vulnerable to influenza 
A(H17N8)”.  Ps rated how worried they were about getting influenza A(H17N8) on a 7-point 
scale with 1 indicating very slightly or not at all worried and 7 indicating extremely worried. 
 Ps indicated their intentions to engage in each of five flu-related behaviors including 
discussing the feedback with a doctor, asking a doctor for antiviral drugs, getting a flu shot, 
increasing hand-washing frequency, and looking for more information about the flu on a 7- point 
scale with 1 indicating very slightly or not at all likely and 7 indicating extremely likely and on a 
percentage scale with 0% meaning no chance of performing the behavior and 100% meaning 
definitely performing the behavior. Ps were also asked to choose yes or no to indicate whether 
they would or would not execute the behavior.  Perceived difficulty and efficacy of the behaviors 
were assessed as possible control variables. Ps rated the difficulty of performing each of the 
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behaviors on a 7-point scale with 1 meaning very slightly or not at all difficult and 7 indicating 
extremely difficult.  Ps rated their perceived efficacy of getting a flu shot, taking antiviral drugs, 
and increasing hand washing frequency on a similar 7-point scale.  The behaviors were selected 
because they vary in difficulty and several of the behaviors are actual recommendations for flu 
prevention (CDC, n.d.).  To measure some form of actual behavior, Ps were given the option of 
placing their name and email address in a box to receive more information on flu and flu 
prevention.  They were also able to select and take home up to five brochures containing 
accurate information about flu and its prevention and treatment.  To eliminate demand effects, Ps 
were able to engage in these behaviors when the experimenter was not present. 
After assessing behavior, several measures were included to assess the effectiveness of 
the risk manipulation.  Ps  rated how serious of a health threat they felt A(H17N8) was to them 
on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (very slightly or not at all serious) to 7 (extremely serious).  Ps 
recalled whether their risk was above, below, or the same as average. 
Control and demographic items. Ps completed a series of items for control purposes.  
These included items assessing gender, age, race, and the extended form of the PANAS 
(PANAS-X) used to measure trait affect (Watson & Clark, 1994).  Ps were also asked questions 
related to the frequency with which they perform behaviors related to the dependent variables in 
the study (e.g., frequency of doctor visits, seeking health information, and hand washing, and flu 
shot and antiviral medication history). 
Debriefing.  Ps were told that any time they complete more than one study at a time, 
researchers issue a debriefing questionnaire.  On this questionnaire, Ps guessed the purposes of 
the two supposedly separate studies. They were also asked if they thought there was a connection 
between the two studies, and if so, what the connection was.  If Ps believed there was a 
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connection, the experimenter verbally probed them to determine if they thought the connection 
existed before or after being asked the question on the debriefing questionnaire. 
Ps underwent a process debriefing procedure (Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975) to make 
sure they understood the true nature of the study and the need for deception.  They were 
encouraged to ask any questions they had.  Ps were allowed to keep any brochures they took 
during the health risk/false feedback study, and all Ps were given more information about flu and 
flu prevention.  Lastly, Ps completed a form acknowledging the deception and stating whether or 
not they gave permission for the use of their data.   
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3.0 RESULTS 
 
All Ps gave permission for their data to be used. Four Ps were eliminated from analyses 
because they correctly guessed the hypotheses, did not believe the feedback, or surmised a 
connection between the two studies, and 13 Ps were removed because they received an outdated 
or incorrect version of materials.  Four additional Ps were removed because at the end of the 
study, they could not correctly recall the risk feedback they were given.  These 21 Ps were 
eliminated from analyses, leaving a final sample size of 187 (67.4% female, 85.0% White, M age 
= 18.89 years).  There were 33 Ps in the happy/low condition, 28 in the happy/high condition, 30 
in the sad/low condition, and 32 in the sad/high, neutral/low, and neutral/high conditions. 
Analyses were also conducted including the eight Ps who had either guessed the hypotheses, did 
not believe the feedback, or could not correctly recall their feedback. All results were the same, 
with the exception of the effect of risk feedback on behavioral intentions measured on a 
percentage scale, which was significant (instead of only marginally so) when the removed Ps 
were included. 
 
3.1 ANALYSIS PLAN 
First, manipulation checks of the emotion induction and risk feedback manipulation were 
performed.  Then, analyses of variance (ANOVAs), logistic regression analyses, and multiple 
regression analyses were conducted to test the hypotheses. Preliminary ANOVAs indicated that 
potential control variables (i.e.,  baseline positive and negative affect, baseline risk perceptions, 
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trait positive and negative affect, health behavior history, and perceived difficulty and efficacy of 
health behaviors) and demographic items (i.e., age, race) did not differ by condition and thus 
these variables were not included in analyses. Regression analyses showed that gender did not 
systematically moderate or explain any of the reported effects and thus are not discussed further.  
An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests.  Ps for whom there were missing data for 
any variable included in a particular analysis were not included in that analysis, resulting in 
slightly varying Ns across analyses.   
 
3.2 MANIPULATION CHECKS 
Emotion induction.  Both baseline emotions and post-video emotion ratings were 
assessed. Baseline affect was analyzed after the initial neutral telescope video in order to test the 
effectiveness of the neutral manipulation. A positive affect factor was created by averaging the 
ratings for amusement, love, pride, happiness, interest, surprise, and joy (α = .79), and a negative 
affect factor was created by combining ratings of embarrassment, anger, fear, anxiety, guilty, 
sadness, confusion, shame, contempt, disgust, and unhappiness (α = .60).  Baseline positive 
affect was low with means ranging from 1.30 to 1.70, as was negative affect with means of 0.23 
to 0.40. Separate two-way ANOVAs showed that there were no differences among the six 
conditions in baseline positive affect or negative affect, Fs < 1.99,  ps > .05, so baseline affect 
was not included in any other analyses. 
Ps rated 18 emotions after viewing the emotion induction videos so as not to draw 
attention to the five emotion words that were of interest.  Three emotions (amusement, 
happiness, and joy) were averaged to create a happiness score (α = .85), and two emotions 
(sadness and unhappiness) were combined for a sadness score (α = .92).  A two-way ANOVA 
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showed that there was a significant effect of video on happiness scores, F (2, 181) = 131.24, p < 
.001. Tukey HSD post-hoc tests indicated that Ps who watched the happy video (M = 4.21, SD = 
1.86) were more happy than Ps who watched the sad (M = 0.66, SD = 1.07) or neutral (M = 0.92, 
SD = 1.10) videos. As expected (because Ps had not yet received risk feedback), there were no 
significant differences in happiness scores based on risk feedback condition nor was there an 
interaction between risk feedback and video viewed, Fs < 0.58, ps > .05.  A two-way ANOVA 
showed similar results for sadness scores such that there was a significant difference in scores 
based on video condition, F(2, 181) = 317.39, p < .001.  Tukey HSD post-hoc tests indicated that 
Ps who watched the sad video (M = 5.19, SD = 2.07) were more sad than Ps who watched the 
happy (M = 0.18, SD = 0.72) or neutral videos (M = 0.13, SD = 0.35).  There was no interaction, 
nor were there any differences based on risk feedback condition, Fs < 0.92, ps > .05.  These 
findings suggest that the emotion induction was successful. 
Risk feedback manipulation. Perceived risk of getting the flu was assessed on a 7-point 
scale and as level of agreement with feelings of risk and vulnerability. These items were 
standardized and had high internal consistency (α = .75). They were therefore averaged to create 
a perceived risk score with higher scores indicating higher perceived risk.  It should be noted that 
the means for Ps in the high risk condition fell above the midpoint on the 7-point item, and 
between disagree mildly and agree mildly for the other two items. The means for the low risk 
condition fell below the midpoint on the 7-point item and between disagree strongly and 
disagree mildly for the other two items. A two-way ANOVA using the composite perceived risk 
measure as the dependent variable indicated that Ps in the high risk condition reported feeling 
more at risk (M = 0.44, SD = 0.73) than Ps in the low risk condition (M = -0.43, SD = 0.64), F(1, 
181) = 73.69, p < .001. There was no effect of emotion condition or an interaction between 
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emotion condition and feedback condition, Fs < 0.29, ps > .05. This finding suggests that the risk 
feedback manipulation worked as intended and also supports Hypothesis 1, that higher risk 
feedback will result in greater risk perceptions. 
Ps were also asked how serious of a health threat the flu was to them.  Ps in the high risk 
condition thought the flu was a more serious threat (M = 3.67, SD = 1.28) than Ps in the low risk 
condition (M = 3.31, SD = 1.33), F(1, 181) = 3.83, p = .05.  There were no effects of emotion 
condition nor was there an interaction between emotion and risk feedback, Fs < 1.59, ps > .05. 
These analyses provide more evidence that the risk feedback manipulation was successful. 
 
3.3 TESTING HYPOTHESES 1 AND 2- REACTIONS TO RISK FEEDBACK IN THE 
PRESENCE OF EMOTION 
To test hypotheses 1 and 2, reactions to feedback (i.e., positive affect, negative affect, 
risk perceptions, worry) were analyzed. It was expected that there would be a main effect of risk 
such that high risk feedback would result in less positive affect and worry, more negative affect, 
and higher risk perceptions (Hypothesis 1). Hypothesis 2 predicted that experiencing prior 
emotion and feedback of matching valence (i.e., sad/high risk, happy/low risk) would result in 
stronger responses to feedback when compared to people in neutral conditions receiving the 
same type of feedback, and it was expected that weaker reactions (compared to neutral) would be 
experienced if emotion and feedback did not correspond (i.e., happy/high risk, sad/low risk).  
Emotional reactions to feedback. To measure emotional reactions to feedback, a positive 
affect (PA) and negative affect (NA) score were constructed from the post-feedback emotion 
inventory. The 12 ratings given for negative adjectives (distressed, upset, guilty, scared, hostile, 
irritable, ashamed, jittery, nervous, afraid, sad, anxious) were summed (α = .82). Similarly, 13 
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ratings of positive adjectives (interested, excited, strong, enthusiastic, proud, alert, inspired, 
determined, attentive, active, happy, elated, amused) were also summed (α = .83).  Because NA 
was not normally distributed, it was log-transformed using natural logs (ln).  The ln is a 
monotonically increasing function, so higher values of the ln of NA correspond to more NA than 
lesser values.  
High risk Ps reported experiencing less PA (M = 23.84, SD = 6.32) than low risk Ps (M = 
26.57, SD = 7.25), F(1, 179) = 7.65, p < .01. Similarly, high risk Ps felt more NA (M = 2.77, SD 
= 0.27) than low risk Ps (M = 2.66, SD = .23), F(1, 181) = 10.04, p < .01.  There were no 
significant effects of emotion condition on either positive or negative affect, nor were there any 
significant interactions, Fs < 1.03, ps > .05.  Because a main effect of risk was found in the 
direction expected for both positive and negative affect, Hypothesis 1 was supported.  Because 
emotion condition did not significantly affect emotional responses or moderate effects of risk 
feedback, Hypothesis 2 was not supported. 
Risk perceptions. Testing Hypotheses 1 and 2 requires the investigation of risk 
perceptions in response to feedback. As explained when presenting the risk feedback 
manipulation checks, Ps in the high risk condition felt more at risk than Ps in the low risk 
condition, providing support for Hypothesis 1. There was no effect of emotion or interaction of 
the two independent variables, indicating that Hypothesis 2 was not supported.  
Worry. Worry about getting the flu as a response to feedback was also investigated in 
order to further explore Hypotheses 1 and 2. High risk Ps experienced more worry (M = 3.73, SD 
= 1.35) than did low risk Ps (M = 3.00, SD = 1.32), F(1, 179) = 13.21 , p < .001, and there was 
no effect of emotion condition or interaction between the two independent variables, Fs < 2.44, 
ps > .05.  Hypothesis 1 was supported, and Hypothesis 2 was not. 
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3.4 TESTING HYPOTHESIS 3- RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FEEDBACK AND 
BEHAVIOR AND REACTIONS AND BEHAVIOR 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that high risk feedback would increase intentions to engage in and 
actual engagement in behavior relative to low risk feedback. It was also hypothesized that 
reactions to feedback would predict intentions and behavior. In order to test these predictions, the 
relationships between feedback and behavioral intentions and behavior were assessed using 
ANOVA and logistic regression, respectively. Multiple and logistic regression were also used to 
test the predicted relationships between reactions to feedback and intentions and behavior.  
Feedback and behavioral intentions. Intentions to engage in five different flu-related 
health behaviors were measured on three different scales. The 7-point scale items (α = .78) and 
percentage scale items (α = .80) were each averaged to create two separate measures of 
behavioral intentions. The yes/no choice items did not have sufficiently high reliability and are 
not discussed further.  Risk feedback affected intentions to engage in the health behaviors on 
both the 7-point, F(1, 179) = 4.78, p < .05, and percentage scales, F(1, 179) = 3.36, p = .07. High 
risk Ps expressed more intentions to engage in behaviors (7-point M = 3.41, SD = 1.30; 
percentage M = 40.24, SD = 22.05) than did low risk Ps (7-point M = 3.00, SD = 1.20; 
percentage M = 34.43, SD = 19.46). Emotion did not have an effect on intentions, and there were 
no interactions between emotion and risk, Fs < 0.61, ps > .05.  Because the main effect of risk 
was significant at the conventional .05 level for one of the intentions measures, Hypothesis 3 was 
partially supported.   
Feedback and behavior. Ps were given the option of taking five different pamphlets with 
information on flu and flu prevention and of putting their name in a box to receive more 
information about flu and flu prevention. The number of pamphlets taken was not distributed 
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normally, so this outcome was coded as a dichotomous variable with 0 indicating that Ps took no 
pamphlets and 1 indicating that they took at least one pamphlet. Whether or not Ps put their 
contact information in a box for more information was also treated dichotomously (0 = name not 
in box, 1 = name in box).  The two behaviors were moderately correlated (r = .41, p < .01).   
Two separate logistic regression analyses were conducted using a risk dummy variable (0 = low 
risk, 1 = high risk), a happiness dummy variable (0 = neutral or sad, 1 = happy), and a sadness 
dummy variable (0 = neutral or happy, 1 = sad) as predictors, and one of the dichotomous 
behavior variables as the dependent variable. 
 For the first analysis, the dependent variable was pamphlets taken.  Coefficients 
associated with the risk variable, sadness dummy variable, and interactions of both risk and 
sadness and risk and happiness were all significant (see Table 2 for Bs, ORs, CIs, and p values). 
The positive coefficient for the risk variable indicates that high risk Ps were more likely to take 
pamphlets than low risk Ps.  The positive coefficient for the sad dummy variable indicates that 
sad Ps were more likely to take pamphlets than neutral Ps.  A similar interpretation of the happy 
dummy variable can be made (although this variable was not significant). More importantly, 
these patterns were qualified by the significant interactions of happiness and risk and sadness and 
risk indicating that emotion moderated the effects of risk.  The coefficients for the interaction 
terms were negative and of similar magnitude to the risk variable, indicating that the influence of 
risk is minimized by the presence of emotion.  
To further explore this interaction, ORs for each condition were obtained by substituting 
the proper values for the predictors and using the resulting logit to obtain the OR (see Table 3).  
Neutral/high risk Ps were most likely to take pamphlets (though the OR = 1.00 indicates that 
they were equally likely to take them as to not take them), and neutral/low risk Ps were least 
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likely to take pamphlets, as shown by OR = 0.19.  Ps in all other conditions were more likely to 
take pamphlets than neutral/low risk Ps and less likely to take than neutral/high risk Ps, 
suggesting that experiencing an emotion made Ps less sensitive to the risk feedback. 
A similar analysis was conducted using the same independent variables and whether or 
not Ps placed their name in the box as the dependent variable. Risk was the only significant 
predictor, and high risk Ps were more likely to put their name in the box than low risk Ps (OR = 
2.48, 95% CI = 1.15 – 5.35, p < .05).  There were no effects of emotion or interactions of risk 
and emotion (ps > .05). 
 Reactions to feedback and behavioral intentions and behavior. In order to test whether or 
not reactions to feedback predicted behavior and intentions (Hypothesis 3), regression analyses 
were conducted entering post-feedback positive and negative affect, worry, and risk perceptions 
simultaneously as independent variables. Multiple regression analyses were conducted for the 
behavioral intentions variables, and logistic regression analyses were conducted for the 
dichotomous behavior variables. Analyses were repeated with only significant predictors, and the 
standardized regression coefficients (βs) or odds ratios (ORs) are reported below.  
 For the 7-point behavioral intentions measure, both positive affect (β = .22, t = 3.62, p < 
.001) and worry (β = .53, t = 8.73, p < .001) were significant predictors, indicating that increases 
in positive affect or worry were associated with increased intentions to engage in health 
behaviors. Similarly, positive affect (β = .24, t = 3.85, p < .001) and worry (β = .39, t = 5.09, p < 
.001) predicted the percentage measure of behavioral intentions in the same direction.  Perceived 
risk was also a significant predictor (β = .16, t = 2.15, p < .05), and increased risk perceptions 
were associated with greater intentions to perform health behaviors.  The finding that several 
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reaction variables (positive affect, worry, and risk perceptions) predicted behavioral intentions 
provides partial support for Hypothesis 3. 
 Worry (OR = 1.44, 95% CI = 1.14 – 1.81, p < .01 ) was the only significant predictor of 
the taking pamphlets variable, indicating that Ps who were more worried were more likely to 
take pamphlets than less worried Ps.  None of the reaction variables predicted whether or not Ps 
put their name in the box for more information.  The finding that worry was associated with one 
of the behaviors (taking pamphlets) provides partial support for Hypothesis 3.  
 
3.5 TESTING HYPOTHESIS 4 – REACTIONS AS MEDIATORS OF FEEDBACK – 
BEHAVIOR RELATIONSHIP 
 Hypothesis 4 predicted that reactions to feedback and intentions would mediate the 
relationship between risk feedback and behavior. Mediation analyses were conducted according 
to the steps recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986) to test the mediation model pictured in 
Figure 1 and predicted in Hypothesis 4. This model predicts that reactions to feedback (i.e., 
positive affect, negative affect, worry, risk perceptions) and behavioral intentions mediate the 
relationship between risk feedback and behavior. Each potential mediator was tested separately. 
Because the predictor variables and potential mediators were continuous and the outcome 
variables were dichotomous, the coefficients were transformed before conducting Sobel tests of 
significance of mediated effects (Herr, n.d.; Kenny, 2008; MacKinnon & Dwyer, 1993; Sobel, 
1982). Neither the reaction variables nor behavioral intentions mediated the relationship between 
risk feedback and taking pamphlets. Sobel tests indicated that behavioral intentions mediated the 
relationship between risk feedback and putting a name in the box for more information (7-point 
intentions: t = 1.99, p = .05; percentage intentions: t = 1.74, p = .09).    
31 
 
3.6 ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
Examining the patterns of means for the behavior dependent variables revealed that Ps in 
the happy and sad conditions might have differed from those in the neutral condition, but not 
from each other.  For this reason, ancillary analyses were conducted to explore whether the 
distinction between experiencing an emotion and experiencing no emotion is an important one.  
For these analyses, two-way ANOVAs were conducted comparing only Ps in the happy and sad 
conditions on the continuous dependent variables, and no differences were found, Fs < 1.60, ps > 
.05.  There were no significant interactions of the emotion variable and risk feedback, Fs < 1.69, 
ps > .05, and the main effect of risk still held for the positive affect, negative affect, risk 
perception, and worry dependent variables, Fs > 4.20, ps < .05.  Logistic regression analyses 
show that there were no effects of the emotion variable, risk feedback condition, or interactions 
of the two on either of the dichotomous behavior variables, ps > .05. 
Because the happy and sad conditions did not differ, Ps in either of those conditions were 
combined into an “emotion” group, which was then compared to the neutral condition with two-
way ANOVAs.  These ANOVAs showed that a main effect of risk occurred for positive affect, 
negative affect, risk, worry, behavioral intentions (both 7-point scale and percentage scale), Fs > 
4.08, ps < .05. There were no effects of the emotion variable, Fs < 1.32, ps > .05, or interactions 
of risk and emotion, Fs < 1.70, ps > .05. 
Two logistic regression analyses were conducted using a risk dummy variable (0 = low 
risk, 1 = high risk) and an emotion dummy variable (0 = neutral, 1 = happy or sad).  Whether or 
not Ps  took pamphlets or put their name in the box for more information was coded as before. 
Risk was the only significant predictor of whether or not Ps put their name in the box. High risk 
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Ps were more likely to put their name in the box than low risk Ps (OR = 2.45, 95% CI = 1.14 – 
5.28, p < .05).  There were no effects of emotion or interactions of risk and emotion (ps > .05). 
Analyses show that there were significant effects of risk, emotion, and their interaction 
for the variable assessing whether or not Ps took pamphlets (see Table 4 for Bs, ORs, CIs, and p 
values). The positive coefficient for the risk variable indicates that high risk Ps were more likely 
to take pamphlets than low risk Ps.  The positive coefficient for the emotion variable indicates 
that Ps experiencing an emotion were more likely to take pamphlets than neutral Ps.  These 
patterns were qualified by the significant interaction between risk and emotion, which indicated 
that emotion moderated the effects of risk.  The coefficient for the interaction term was negative 
and of similar magnitude to the risk variable, confirming earlier findings that the influence of 
risk is minimized by the presence of emotion.  
To explore this interaction, ORs for each condition were again obtained by substituting 
the proper values for the predictors and using the resulting logit to compute the OR (see Table 5).  
The ORs for neutral/high risk and neutral/low risk Ps were the same as before.  Ps in both the 
emotion/low risk and emotion/high risk groups were more likely than neutral/low risk Ps and less 
likely than neutral/high risk Ps to take pamphlets, confirming that experiencing an emotion made 
Ps less sensitive to the risk feedback. 
 
 
  
33 
 
 
 
4.0 DISCUSSION  
 
The study presented here was conducted in order to explore the effects of emotion on 
reactions to health feedback.  Hypothesis 1 predicted that receiving high risk feedback would 
result in more negative affect and worry, less positive affect, and higher risk perceptions than 
receiving low risk feedback.  Analyses showed that this hypothesis was entirely supported and 
that reactions to high and low risk feedback were clearly differentiated in the way expected. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that experiencing an emotion followed by risk feedback of similar 
valence would result in stronger reactions (positive and negative affect, risk perceptions, and 
worry) as compared to participants whose risk feedback was preceded by neutral affect.  
Similarly, it was predicted that experiencing emotion and feedback that were not of the same 
valence would result in weaker reactions when compared to neutral people getting the same type 
of feedback.  Hypothesis 2 was unsupported in that emotion did not affect any of the reaction 
variables or moderate the effects of risk feedback.   
Though it is not clear why Hypothesis 2 was not supported and why emotion had no 
effect on reactions to feedback, several possibilities exist. The emotion induced by the film clips 
was relatively mild, and it is possible that the magnitude of emotional reactions to the risk 
feedback dominated the effect of previous emotional states. Contributing to this potential 
explanation is the inclusion of a manipulation check after viewing the emotion induction film 
clips. Completing the emotion inventory may have resulted in participants consciously 
attributing their emotions to the film clips, minimizing the effect of emotional experience on 
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subsequent judgments (Keltner et al., 1993). The manipulation check was included to ensure that 
the clips induced the target emotion in light of the fact that the neutral clips had not been used 
previously, but in the future, it would be better if only a subsample of participants complete 
emotion manipulation checks. 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that feedback would affect behavioral intentions and behavior and 
also that reactions to feedback would predict behavioral intentions and health information-
seeking behavior. Feedback affected behavioral intentions, though one of the measures was only 
marginally significant. Feedback also affected an information-seeking behavior – taking 
pamphlets – such that participants in the neutral condition were most likely to take pamphlets if 
they were at high risk and least likely to take them if they were at low risk.  Participants who 
experienced happiness or sadness were less sensitive to risk than neutral participants, making 
them less likely to take pamphlets than neutral/high risk participants and more likely to take 
them when compared to neutral/low risk participants. Feedback and emotion did not affect the 
other emotion variable – placing one’s name in a box to receive more information. There are two 
probable reasons for this null finding.  First, participants may have felt that taking pamphlets 
immediately provided a sufficient amount of information (explaining the moderate, not high, 
correlation between the two behavior variables) and eliminated the need to receive more 
information later.  Secondly, not putting their name in a box may merely be a reflection of the 
student participants’ desire to finalize their participation and minimize future contact with 
research staff.  
Providing additional support for Hypothesis 3 is the finding that some reaction variables 
(positive affect, worry, and risk perceptions) predicted intentions such that an increase in 
reactions resulted in greater intentions to engage in health behavior.  Experiencing more worry 
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resulted in participants being more likely to take informational pamphlets about flu and flu 
prevention, but no reactions predicted the likelihood of participants putting their name in a box to 
receive more information. The finding that increased positive affect, increased worry, or higher 
perceived risk could result in greater intentions suggests an inverted-U shaped relationship 
between negative reactions and feedback behavior such that mid-level positive affect and 
negative reactions (i.e., worry and perceived risk) could result in greater intentions to engage in 
behavior than low levels of positive affect and high levels of negatively valenced reactions (i.e., 
worry and perceived risk) or high positive affect and low negative reactions.  It is also possible 
that people experiencing positive affect endorsed health behaviors as a method of mood 
maintenance, and people experiencing worry or feeling at risk endorsed the same behaviors as a 
plan to minimize their risk and the negative thoughts accompanying it.   
Hypothesis 4 predicted that reaction variables would mediate the relationship between 
risk feedback condition and behavior.  None of the reaction variables served as mediators, but 
behavioral intentions mediated the relationship between risk feedback condition and giving 
contact information to receive more information about the flu.  Neither the reaction variables nor 
the intentions variables mediated the relationship between risk feedback and likelihood of taking 
pamphlets. Intentions may not have affected pamphlet-taking behavior because the intentions 
measure was a composite measure of self-reported plans to engage in several health behaviors, 
not a specific measure of intentions to take pamphlets. The previous findings about the 
relationship between risk feedback and reactions and intentions suggest that risk feedback affects 
resulting emotion, worry, and risk perceptions, which in turn affect intentions. These intentions 
then drive information-seeking behavior.    
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Ancillary analyses for which there were no a priori hypotheses indicated that there were 
no differences between the behavior of happy and sad participants in response to feedback.  
Participants experiencing any emotion behaved differently than participants who were in a 
neutral state. More specifically, it was confirmed that participants experiencing any emotion and 
told they were at either high or low risk were more likely to take pamphlets than neutral/low risk 
participants and less likely to take them than neutral/high risk participants. The reason for this 
finding is not clear, but some speculation can be made. As mentioned earlier, completing 
emotion manipulation checks may have caused participants to associate their emotion with 
viewing video clips, minimizing emotion’s effect on subsequent judgments (Keltner et al., 1993).  
Behavior is not a judgment in the same way that reporting emotional reactions or risk 
perceptions is, and so prior emotion may have had an opportunity to affect it. More specifically, 
attributing emotion to watching videos may reduce the effect of prior emotion on later self-
reports of emotional reactions to feedback because participants may consciously feel that the 
prior emotion is not relevant to the current emotion judgment. Participants may not view the 
prior affect as being related to their behavior and so they may not consciously consider whether 
or not their affect is relevant to the behavior, allowing prior affect to influence behavior. As 
discussed earlier, participants who had been happy may have taken pamphlets in order to 
maintain their affect and feel good about doing something for their health.  Sad participants may 
have been processing more systematically (Bless et al., 1990; Bodenhausen, Sheppard, et al., 
1994) and so may have also sought out more information about their health. Neutral participants 
would have had no need to change their affective state, so they may have focused only on the 
risk feedback when deciding to take pamphlets or not. 
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A significant body of research in the risk communication field focuses on giving people 
more information and accurate information about their risk, but the findings of the study detailed 
here show that affect unrelated to the feedback situation can alter the way in which people 
perceive their feedback and how they act as a result.  Giving accurate personalized feedback may 
not be received in the way intended if the recipient is experiencing an emotion.  Given that 
people have limited resources for coping with feedback (both physical and self-regulatory; 
Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), it could be problematic that if when experiencing an emotion, 
people with minimal risk are still dedicating resources to reducing an already low risk instead of 
allocating those resources to pursuits that would be more beneficial to their health. 
Other researchers (Winterich et al., 2008) have found that transitions from one emotional 
state to another depend on appraisals associated with the emotions.  The findings in this study 
did not support such an account as both happy and sad prior affect resulted in similar behavior, 
and neither emotion influenced self-reported affective and cognitive reactions to a subsequent 
emotion-inducing event (i.e., receiving feedback).  It is possible that receiving health feedback 
could result in mixed emotions (e.g., simultaneous sadness, fear, and/or anger in response to a 
positive test result for a disease), leading to mixed appraisals, making it more complicated to 
predict the influence of a prior emotion on the emotions arising from the feedback.  
There are wider implications for giving people different types of positive or negative 
feedback about themselves.  Affect unrelated to the feedback may influence the actions people 
undertake upon receiving such feedback.  For example, receiving feedback about one’s social 
standing while in an affective state might result in allocating too few resources to resolving a 
severe social conflict (mirroring a high risk situation) or more resources than are really necessary 
in the case of a milder incident (similar to a low risk situation).  Another application could be to 
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stereotype threat situations.  Stereotype threat refers to situations where people (e.g., minority 
students taking an exam) feel that they are in a situation where they are stereotyped (e.g., the 
same students being aware that there is a stereotype that members of their minority group are 
unintelligent) and then are at risk of fulfilling the stereotype (Steele & Aronson, 1995).  Such a 
situation could be considered a “high risk” situation, and experiencing an emotion prior to being 
exposed to this threatening information might result in students being less successful at using 
techniques to avoid performing poorly (e.g., affirming the self when in a threat situation; 
Martens, Johns, Greenberg, & Schimel, 2006) than students in a neutral affective state. 
From a methodological perspective, this study makes several contributions.  First, truly 
neutral film clips were established.  Other neutral induction clips often induce mild positive 
affect or feelings of calm or displeasure because the clip is boring (Rottenberg et al., 2007).  The 
finding that experiencing an emotion can influence some subsequent behavior emphasizes the 
possibility that affect that participants are experiencing upon arrival to the lab could potentially 
influence manipulations or dependent variables, highlighting the need for researchers to induce 
neutrality at the beginning of emotion experiments.  A contribution was also made in the 
development of a false feedback paradigm that allows researchers to explore the role of health 
feedback in the laboratory in a realistic way that does not rely on vignettes or hypothetical 
scenarios.  It is likely that the feedback manipulation was successful because the fictitious health 
problem was described so that participants would believe that their lives could be affected by the 
problem. At the same time, the problem was not so severe or scary as to immediately result in 
defensive processing.  Also, the risk estimates given to participants were considered to be high in 
an absolute sense as well as a comparative sense, confirming findings of a wide body of research 
showing that absolute and comparative feedback have predictable effects on people’s emotions, 
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cognitions, and behavior (Buckley et al., 2004; Croyle et al., 1993; Fries et al., 1997; Gaugler et 
al., 2006; Jussim et al., 1995; Klein, 1997, 2003a, 2003b; Leary et al., 2003; Lerman et al., 1991; 
McBride et al., 2000; Woo & Mix, 1997). 
The current study and its findings yield multiple directions for future research. A logical 
extension of this work is to explore the role of affect on responses to other types of health 
information besides risk feedback. Indeed, a project is currently underway to investigate how 
emotion may affect the interpretation of information and the decisions made by people 
considering whether or not to enroll in clinical trials.  Furthermore, the role of other emotions in 
influencing reactions to health information could be investigated.  Often negative emotions are 
associated with receiving health feedback, and the effects of fear and anxiety on reactions to 
feedback could be explored.  In the current study, worry, a construct that is simultaneously 
affective and cognitive, was the only reaction to feedback that predicted behavior.  This finding 
indicates that worry should continue to be explored as a variable distinct from negative affect 
that may influence health behavior.  The possibility that mixed emotional states might be 
experienced by people prior to receiving feedback as well as afterwards deserves further 
investigation. Future research might also explore what types of behaviors emotion might be most 
likely to influence.  For example, emotions may be most likely to affect intentions and 
engagement in behaviors that could reduce negative affect or maintain positive affect. 
The findings of this study are of interest to social psychologists as well as researchers 
from outside of the field studying emotions and reactions to various types of feedback.  
Receiving high risk feedback results in feeling worse, worrying more, intending to engage in 
more healthy behavior, and seeking more health information than getting low risk feedback. 
However, emotion that is experienced prior to getting such feedback can influence the way 
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people behave. More research needs to investigate how even seemingly innocuous emotional 
experiences can exert their influence on outcomes of great consequence, such as health behavior.  
 
  
41 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Ajzen, I. (1985). From intentions to actions: A theory of planned behaviour. In J. Kuhl & J. 
Beckmann (Eds.), Action control: From cognition to behavior (pp. 11 – 39). Berlin: 
Springer-Verlag. 
Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behaviour. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 50, 179-211. 
Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (1980). Understanding attitudes and predicting social behavior. 
Englewood Cliffs, NH: Prentice Hall. 
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator distinction in social 
psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 1173-1182. 
Bless, H., Bohner, G., Schwarz, N., & Strack, F. (1990). Mood and persuasion: A cognitive 
response analysis. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 16(2), 331-345. 
Bodenhausen, G. V., Kramer, G. P., & Süsser, K.  (1994). Happiness and stereotypic thinking in 
social judgment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 621-632. 
Bodenhausen, G. V., Sheppard, L. A., & Kramer, G. P.  (1994). Negative affect and social 
judgment: The differential impact of anger and sadness. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 24, 45-62. 
Brewer, N. T., Chapman, G. B., Gibbons, F. X., Gerrard, M., McCaul, K. D., & Weinstein, N. D. 
(2007).  Meta-analysis of the relationship between risk perception and health behavior: The 
example of vaccination. Health Psychology, 26(2), 136-145. 
42 
 
Buckley, K. E., Winkel, R. E., & Leary, M. R. (2004). Reactions to acceptance and rejection: 
Effects of level and sequence of relational evaluation. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 40(1), 14-28.  
Cacioppo, J. T., Berntson, G. G., Larsen, J. T., Poehlmann, K. M., & Ito, T. A. (2000).  The 
psychophysiology of emotion. In M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), Handbook of 
emotions (2nd ed.) (pp. 173-191). New York: The Guilford Press. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). (n.d.). Preventing the flu. Retrieved June 5, 
2007, from http://www.cdc.gov/flu/protect/preventing.htm. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). (2006, August 30). Key facts about influenza 
and the influenza vaccine. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from 
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/keyfacts.htm. 
Chapman, G. B., & Coups, E. J. (2006). Emotions and preventive health behavior: Worry, regret, 
and influenza. Health Psychology, 25(1), 82-90. 
Croyle, R. T., Sun, Y., & Louie, D. H. (1993). Psychological minimization of cholesterol test 
results: Moderators of appraisal in college students and community residents. Health 
Psychology, 12, 503-507. 
Discovery Education. (2004). Investigating sound and light [Motion picture]. United States: 
Discovery Education. 
Epstein, S., Lipson, A., Holstein, C., & Huh, E. (1992). Irrational reactions to negative outcomes: 
Evidence for two conceptual systems. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 
328–339.  
43 
 
Feldman-Stewart, D., Kocovski, N., McConnell, B. A., Brundage, M. D., & Mackillop, W. J. 
(2000). Perception of quantitative information for treatment decisions. Medical Decision 
Making, 20, 228-238. 
Finucane, M. L., Alhakami, A., Slovic, P., & Johnson, S. M. (2000). The affect heuristic in 
judgments of risks and benefits.  Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 13(1), 1-17. 
Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (1975). Belief, attitude, intention, and behavior: An introduction to 
theory and research. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Forgas, J. P. (1995). Mood and judgment: The Affect Infusion Model (AIM). Psychological 
Bulletin, 117, 39-66. 
Fries, E. A., Bowen, D. J., Hopp, H. P., & White, K. S. (1997). Psychological effects of dietary 
fat analysis and feedback: A randomized feedback design. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 
20(6), 607-619. 
Gaugler, J. E., Pavlik, E., Salsman, J. M., & Andrykowski, M. A. (2006). Psychological and 
behavioral impact of receipt of a "normal" ovarian cancer screening test. Preventive 
Medicine: An International Journal Devoted to Practice and Theory, 42(6), 463-470.  
Gerrards-Hesse, A., Spies, K., & Hesse, F. W. (1994). Experimental inductions of emotional 
states and their effectiveness: A review. British Journal of Psychology, 85(1), 55-78.  
Gross, J. J., & Levenson, R. W. (1995). Emotion elicitation using films. Cognition and Emotion, 
9(1), 87-108. 
Herr, N. R. (n.d.). Mediation with dichotomous outcomes. Retrieved May 29, 2008 from 
http://nrherr.bol.ucla.edu/Mediation/logmed.html.  
44 
 
Hoon, P. W., Wincze, J. P., Hoon, E. F. (1977). A test of reciprocal inhibition: Are anxiety and 
sexual arousal in women mutually inhibitory? Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 86(1), 65-
74.  
Johnson, E. J., & Tversky, A. (1983). Affect, generalization, and the perception of risk. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 45(1), 20-31. 
Jussim, L., Yen. H., & Aiello, J.R. (1995). Self-consistency, self-enhancement, and accuracy in 
reactions to feedback. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 31, 322-356.  
Keltner, D., Locke, K. D., & Audrain, P. C. (1993). The influence of attributions on the 
relevance of negative feelings to personal satisfaction. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 19(1), 21-29. 
Kenny, D. A. (2008, May 20). Mediation. Retrieved May 29, 2008 from 
http://davidakenny.net/cm/mediate.htm. 
Klein, W. M. (1997). Objective standards are not enough: Affective, self-evaluative, and 
behavioral responses to social comparison information. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 72, 763-774. 
Klein, W. M. P. (2003a). Effects of objective feedback and “single other” or “average other” 
social comparison feedback on performance judgments and helping behavior. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 418-429. 
Klein, W. M. P. (2003b). Self-prescriptive, perceived, and actual attention to comparative risk 
information. Psychology and Health, 18, 625-643. 
Lazarus, R. S. (1991). Progress on a cognitive-motivational-relational theory of emotion. 
American Psychologist, 46, 819-834. 
45 
 
Leary, M. R., Gallagher, B., Fors, E., Buttermore, N., Baldwin, E., Kennedy, K., et al. (2003).  
The invalidity of disclaimers about the effects of social feedback on self-esteem. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29(5), 623-636.  
Lerman, C., Trock, B., Rimer, B. K., Boyce, A., Jepson, C., & Engstrom, P. F. (1991). 
Psychological and behavioral implications of abnormal mammograms. Annals of Internal 
Medicine, 114(8), 657–661. 
Lerner, J. S., Gonzalez, R. M., Small, D. A., & Fischhoff, B. (2003). Effects of fear and anger on 
perceived risks of terrorism: A national field experiment. Psychological Science, 14, 144-
150. 
Lerner, J. S. & Keltner, D. (2000). Beyond valence: Toward a model of emotion-specific 
influences on judgment and choice. Cognition and Emotion, 14, 473-493.  
Lerner, J. S. & Keltner, D. (2001). Fear, anger, and risk. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 81, 146-159. 
Loewenstein, G. F., Weber, E. U., Hsee, C. K., & Welch, N. (2001). Risk as feelings. 
Psychological Bulletin, 127(2), 267-286.  
MacKinnon, D. P., & Dwyer, J. H. (1993). Estimating mediated effects in prevention studies. 
Evaluation Review, 17, 144-158. 
Martens, A., Johns, M., Greenberg, J., & Schimel, J. (2006). Combating stereotype threat: The 
effect of self-affirmation on women's intellectual performance. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 42, 236-243. 
McBride, C. M., Halabi, S., Bepler, G., Lyna, P., McIntyre, L., Lipkus, I., et al. (2000). 
Maximizing the motivational impact of feedback of lung cancer susceptibility on smokers' 
desire to quit. Journal of Health Communication, 5(3), 229-241.  
46 
 
McCaul, K. D., & Mullens, A. B. (2003). Affect, thought, and self-protective health behavior: 
The case of worry and cancer screening. In J. Suls & K. A. Wallston (Eds.), Social 
psychological foundations of health and illness. Blackwell series in health psychology and 
behavioral medicine (pp. 137-168). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. 
Muraven, M., & Baumeister, R. F. (2000). Self-regulation and depletion of limited resources: 
Does self-control resemble a muscle? Psychological Bulletin, 126, 247-259. 
Reiner, R. (Producer/Director). (1989). When Harry met Sally [Motion picture]. United States: 
MGM/UA Home Entertainment. 
Roseman, I. J., Antoniou, A. A., & Jose, P. E. (1996). Appraisal determinants of emotions: 
Constructing a more accurate and comprehensive theory. Cognition and Emotion, 10(3), 241-
277. 
Ross, L., Lepper, M. R., & Hubbard, M. (1975). Perseverance in self-perception and social 
perception: Biased attributional processes in the debriefing paradigm. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 32(5), 880-892. 
Rottenberg, J., Ray, R. D., & Gross, J. J. (2007). Emotion elicitation using films. In J. A. Coan, 
& J. J. B. Allen (Eds.), The handbook of emotion elicitation and assessment (pp. 9-28). 
London: Oxford University Press. 
Salovey, P., & Birnbaum, D. (1989). Influence of mood on health-relevant cognitions. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 57(3), 539-551. 
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1983). Mood, misattribution and judgments of well-being: 
Informative and directive functions of affective states. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 45(3), 513-523. 
47 
 
Shepperd, J. A., Ouellette, J. A., & Fernandez, J. K. (1996). Abandoning unrealistic optimism: 
Performance estimates and the temporal proximity of self-relevant feedback. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 844-855. 
Slovic, P., & Peters, E. (2006). Risk perception and affect. Current Directions in Psychological 
Science, 15(6), 322-325. 
Slovic, P., Peters, E., Finucane, M. L., & MacGregor, D. G. (2005). Affect, risk, and decision 
making. Health Psychology, 24(4, Suppl), 35-40. 
Smith, C. A., & Ellsworth, P. C. (1985). Patterns of cognitive appraisal in emotion.  Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 48(4), 813-838. 
Sobel, M. E. (1982). Asymptotic intervals for indirect effects in structural equations models. In 
S. Leinhart (Ed.), Sociological methodology 1982 (pp.290-312). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Spering, M., Wagener, D., & Funke, J. (2005). The role of emotions in complex problem-
solving. Cognition and Emotion, 19(8), 1252-1261.  
Steele, C. M., & Aronson, J. (1995). Stereotype threat and the intellectual test performance of 
African-Americans. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 797-811. 
Swann, W. B., Griffin, J. J., Predmore, S. C., & Gaines, B. (1987). The cognitive-affective 
crossfire: When self-consistency confronts self-enhancement. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 52, 881-889. 
Taylor, K. M., & Shepperd, J. A. (1998). Bracing for the worst: Severity, testing and feedback as 
moderators of the optimistic bias. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24, 915-926. 
Watson, D., & Clark, L. A.. (1994). The PANAS-X: Manual for the Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule - Expanded Form.  Retrieved April 24, 2006 from the University of Iowa 
Psychology Department Web Site: http://www.psychology.uiowa.edu/faculty/Clark/. 
48 
 
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures 
of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 54, 1063–1070. 
Weinstein, N. D., Kwitel, A., McCaul, K. D., Magnan, R. E., Gerard, M., & Gibbons, F. X. 
(2007). Risk perception: Assessment and relationship to influenza vaccination. Health 
Psychology, 26(2), 146-151. 
Westermann, R., Spies, K., Stahl, G., & Hesse, F. W. (1996).  Relative effectiveness and validity 
of mood induction procedures: A meta-analysis. European Journal of Social Psychology, 
26(4), 557-580. 
Winterich, K. P., Han, S., & Lerner, J. S. (2008, February). Now that I’m sad, it’s hard to be 
mad: Examining emotion-state transitions. In J. S. Lerner (Chair), Sequential emotion. 
Symposium conducted at the Emotion Preconference to the meeting of the Society for 
Personality and Social Psychology, Albuquerque, New Mexico. 
Witte, K., & Allen, M. (2000). A meta-analysis of fear appeals: Implications for effective public 
health campaigns. Health Education & Behavior, 27, 608-632. 
Woo, T. O., & Mix, P. (1997). Self-enhancing reactions to performance feedback in an academic 
setting. Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 12(2), 481-500.  
Zajac, L. E. (2007). Effect of health worry on processing of health information, behavioral 
intentions, and behavior. Unpublished master’s thesis, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania. 
Zeffirelli, F. (Director). (1979). The champ [Motion picture]. United States: Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer. 
49 
 
Zillmann, D. (1971). Excitation transfer in communication-mediated aggressive behavior. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 7(4), 419-434. 
Zillmann, D. (1978). Attribution and misattribution of excitatory reactions.  In J. H. Harvey, W. 
Ickes, & R. F. Kidd (Eds.), New directions in attribution research: Volume 2 (pp. 335-368). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.  
Zillmann, D. (1996). Sequential dependencies in emotional experience and behavior. In R. D. 
Kavanaugh, B. Zimmerberg, & S. Fein (Eds.), Emotion: Interdisciplinary perspectives (pp. 
243-272). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 
Zillman, D., Bryant, J., Comisky, P. W., & Medoff, N. J. (1981). Excitation and hedonic valence 
in the effect of erotica on motivated intermale aggression. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 11, 233-252. 
Zillmann, D., Katcher, A. H., & Milavsky, B. (1972). Excitation transfer from physical exercise 
to subsequent aggressive behavior. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 8(3), 247-
259. 
Zillmann, D., Mody, B., & Cantor, J. R. (1974). Empathetic perception of emotional displays in 
films as a function of hedonic and excitatory state prior to exposure. Journal of Research in 
Personality, 8(4), 335-349.  
Zillmann, D., & Sapolsky, B. S. (1977). What mediates the effects of mild erotica on annoyance 
and hostile behavior in males? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35(8), 587-
596. 
Zwonitzer, M. (Director/Producer/Writer), & Chin, M. (Director). (2003). Transcontinental 
railroad [Motion picture]. United States: PBS Home Video. 
50 
 
Table 1. Mean (Standard Deviation) Perceived Absolute and Comparative Risk Perceptions for 
Pilot Test Risk Percentage Scenarios 
       Comparative Risk in Scenario 
Average Risk  Risk 
In Scenario  Perception  Low    High 
12%   Absolute  1.31 (0.51)   3.67 (1.19)  
   Comparative  1.67 (0.67)   5.02 (0.75) 
34%    Absolute  2.49 (0.92)   5.24 (0.88) 
   Comparative  2.00 (0.64)   5.56 (0.94) 
57%    Absolute  3.07 (1.03)   6.49 (0.66) 
   Comparative  2.18 (0.75)   6.56 (0.50) 
Note. Ps rated absolute risk magnitude by indicating how low or high they considered their risk 
on a scale from 1 (“very low”) to 7 (“very high”) with 4 indicating “neither low nor high”. Ps 
rated comparative risk on a scale from 1 (“much lower”) to 7 (“much higher”) with 4 indicating 
“about the same”. 
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Table 2. Logistic Regression Results for Emotion (Happiness, Sadness, Neutral) x Risk (Low, 
High) Analysis with Taking Pamphlets as DV
a
 
 
Variables   B  OR  95% CI  p* 
Risk    1.69  5.40  1.66 – 17.56  < .01   
Happiness Dummy  0.85  2.35  0.70 – 7.87  > .05 
Sadness Dummy  1.55  4.73  1.43 – 15.59  = .01 
Risk x Happiness  -1.60  0.20  0.04 – 1.00  = .05  
Risk x Sadness  -2.06  0.13  0.03 – 0.60  < .01 
a
N = 187 
*p values are for Wald chi-square test of association. 
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Table 3. Odds Ratios for Each Condition for Emotion (Happiness, Sadness, Neutral) x Risk 
(Low, High) Analysis with Taking Pamphlets as DV 
 
Emotion Condition  Risk Condition   OR 
Neutral   Low     0.19 
Happy    Low     0.43 
Happy    High     0.47 
Sad    High     0.60 
Sad    Low     0.88 
Neutral   High     1.00 
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Table 4. Logistic Regression Results for Emotion (Emotion, Neutral) x Risk (Low, High) Analysis 
with Taking Pamphlets as DV
a
 
 
Variables   B  OR  95% CI  p* 
Risk    1.69  5.40  1.66 – 17.56  < .01   
Emotion   1.20  3.32  1.13 – 9.80   < .05 
Risk x Emotion  -1.82  0.16  0.04 – 0.65  = .01 
a
N = 187 
*p values are for Wald chi-square test of association. 
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Table 5. Odds Ratios for Each Condition for Emotion (Emotion, Neutral) x Risk (Low, High) 
Analysis with Taking Pamphlets as DV 
 
Emotion Condition  Risk Condition   OR 
Neutral   Low     0.19 
Emotion   High     0.54   
Emotion   Low     0.62 
Neutral   High     1.00   
 
  
  
 
Figure 1. Predicted mediation model. 
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